Overview
Peru’s presidential runoff is unfolding against a backdrop in which a sprawling, informally organized gold-mining sector has become both an economic powerhouse and a decisive political constituency. At the heart of that sector lies REINFO, an administrative program established in 2016 to regulate small-scale miners without requiring full environmental or operational permits. Although the program was originally due to expire in 2020, it has been extended multiple times as the size, economic importance and political influence of the informal mining sector expanded.
Estimates put the number of informal miners at about 500,000, generating approximately $11 billion in gold exports in 2025, or roughly half of the country’s gold exports that year. Those miners are concentrated in rural regions and represent a substantial economic and electoral bloc whose votes could prove decisive in the runoff between conservative Keiko Fujimori and leftist Roberto Sanchez.
How the politics align
Both presidential contenders have sought to win the support of small miners, despite sharply different policy prescriptions and political identities. Polls indicate a tight race with Fujimori holding a modest lead. Fujimori narrowly lost the 2021 presidential contest by about 45,000 votes, or 0.25%, and Sanchez’s base of support includes rural areas where the previous winner performed strongly. That geographic split mirrors differing political calculations: urban Lima and adjacent areas typically back Fujimori, while interior rural departments favor Sanchez.
REINFO is scheduled to expire on December 31. Yet neither campaign appears prepared or politically able to remove the program. For proponents, REINFO is an economic lifeline for residents in impoverished rural communities. Critics counter that it effectively shelters illegal mining activity and organized crime, while contributing to widespread environmental degradation.
Electoral financing, mobilization and influence
An analysis of REINFO registry information and electoral records reveals that participants in the program have spread political support across parties and regions, hedging their bets rather than backing a single national ticket. The Sanchez campaign draws strength from the rural interior, where informal mining is widespread, and mining federations have organized rallies in support of his candidacy.
Data indicate that millions of soles have moved from roughly 450 individuals linked to REINFO to political parties. Those transfers, however, are not confined to one side of the political spectrum and are frequently connected to regional races or self-financed campaigns. Leaders of artisanal mining groups deny systematic corporate-style political financing by their organizations, saying mobilizations are often self-funded.
Magna Ismael Palomino, coordinator of CONFEMIN, Peru’s largest artisanal mining group, said small miners and the network of suppliers and workers tied to them are backing Sanchez. Palomino advocates reallocating idle concessions held by large companies to artisanal miners and has called for REINFO to be extended by at least three years. "We’ve realized that the economic power of big mining has set the governing agenda," he said. "They dictate how small, artisanal mining should be and want it to disappear."
Economic scale and regional underinvestment
Mining accounts for nearly 12% of Peru’s GDP and the country is a major global supplier of copper, gold and silver. Yet many mining regions continue to suffer from limited infrastructure and low public investment. Sanchez has highlighted that gap as a campaign priority, arguing that after decades of mining activity mining towns remain among the poorest in the country. "Thirty years of mining and the mining towns are still the poorest in our country," he said.
At the end of 2025, nearly 20 million hectares were under mining concessions in Peru, with more than half of that land held by medium and large companies. Government and NGO data show only about 10% of concessioned land was actively explored or mined, leaving substantial areas idle and fueling calls from artisanal miners for redistribution of unused acreage.
Large mining companies argue that the ascendancy of informal mining is distorting both political dynamics and the industry. Peru currently has about $63 billion in mining projects under development. Conflicts with informal miners have delayed some projects, including the $2.6 billion Los Chancas project. Raúl Jacob, finance vice president at Southern Copper, warned that the scale of informal mining revenues can create or enable illegal avenues to obtain permits or influence legislation.
Julia Torreblanca, head of Peru’s mining chamber, called for greater transparency in political financing. "Today, illegal mining is a more powerful economy than drug trafficking," she said. "We need transparency on candidates and officials financed by this illegal economy."
Structural weaknesses in REINFO
An examination of REINFO permit data shows that prior enforcement efforts have struggled to change the underlying dynamics of the system. A 2025 purge removed the personal permits of more than 50,000 permit-holders accused of non-compliance, but much of the operational structure endured. A total of 1,005 individuals whose personal permits were revoked are now listed as legal representatives in companies that still hold REINFO permits. In addition, 1,255 companies had at least one permit revoked yet continued operating using other permits.
The registry has regenerated quickly. Some 2,600 legal representative appointments in companies with active REINFO permits were recorded in 2025 or 2026. Individuals can hold multiple registrations - in some cases up to 20 permits across companies and personal registrations. The system also includes foreign nationals and larger firms controlling multiple permits in a regime that was intended for small, local operators.
Compañía Minera Agregados Calcáreos is the single largest permit-holder in the REINFO registry, listed with 35 permits despite losing 13 permits in the 2025 purge. According to the national tax authority SUNAT, the company is owned by Holcim Peru, a subsidiary of the Swiss cement firm Holcim. The parent firm did not respond to a request for comment.
Channels of support and informal backing
Observers note that political support tied to the mining sector is not always visible in formal donation records. Iván Arenas, a mining consultant, said much of the sector's political mobilization is conducted off the books - through logistics, organization and provision of resources to rallies and local campaigns.
Artisanal mining federations have organized public demonstrations across mining regions in support of Sanchez. CONFEMIN leaders maintain they do not routinely finance congressional candidates and reject the idea of exchanging funds for political favors, while acknowledging that individual miners have made contributions to campaigns in a pattern that often aligns with local political contests.
Implications
The interaction between a widely-used administrative permit regime, entrenched economic interests in informal mining, and the proximity of a close presidential contest creates a politically fraught environment. REINFO’s persistence illustrates how a policy tool intended to regulate small-scale mining has become a core element of regional economies and a lever of political influence. With the program slated to expire at year-end, both presidential campaigns face difficult choices about how to address a sector that is simultaneously a source of livelihoods, a driver of environmental harm, and a potent electoral coalition.
What remains uncertain
- Whether either candidate would take unilateral steps to end REINFO if elected is unclear, given its rural support and the operational complexity of replacing or reforming the system.
- How a future administration would manage the political and economic pushback from artisanal miners, and the potential for further delays to major projects in the mining pipeline, remains unknown.
- The extent to which informal channels of political mobilization and financing influence local and national outcomes is difficult to quantify based on the available registry and electoral data.