In recent months, Beijing has escalated an information strategy that elevates comments by Taiwanese critics of the island's ruling party and repackages them for broad circulation across Chinese state media and social platforms. The tactic leverages the recognizability of local politicians, influencers and retired officers to make anti-government messaging more plausible for Taiwan audiences, according to multiple Taiwanese security officials and data from Taipei-based research group IORG.
The approach was visible last December as Chinese warships and fighter jets staged large drills around Taiwan. At the same time, a 51-second video clip posted on Douyin, China’s version of TikTok, showed Taiwan opposition leader Cheng Li-wun accusing President Lai Ching-te of inviting Chinese aggression. In that clip, Cheng said Lai was “dragging all 23 million of us” in Taiwan into a “dead end, a road to death” by pursuing independence. The short item quickly circulated onto platforms popular in Taiwan, including Facebook, YouTube and other services.
According to five Taiwanese security officials and the IORG data, Chinese state outlets are increasingly harvesting public statements from prominent Kuomintang (KMT) figures and other critics of the DPP, then disseminating those statements through a torrent of anti-DPP material on state-run channels and Chinese social media. The clips are frequently reshared and sometimes repackaged for audiences on platforms used in Taiwan, such as Facebook, TikTok and YouTube, as well as on Douyin. In some cases, presentation choices obscure the role of Chinese media in amplifying the content.
Those involved in Taipei’s security apparatus describe the intensified tactic as a turbocharging of earlier propaganda practices that sometimes involved Taiwanese figures. Using familiar voices and accents can increase perceived credibility among Taiwan viewers, the officials said. The campaign also serves explicit political aims: officials described it as part of an effort to discredit a government Beijing accuses of seeking independence, and, according to IORG and three of the security officials, to persuade Taiwanese that China’s military advantages make additional defense spending futile. The DPP has proposed $40 billion in extra defense outlays.
Representatives of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and defense ministry did not respond to requests for comment on the information operations. Taiwan’s defense ministry told this publication it is countering a large uptick in Chinese “cognitive warfare” by bolstering media-literacy training and psychological resilience within the armed forces. President Lai’s office said cross-strait peace must be "built on strength, not on concessions to authoritarian pressure." Facebook, TikTok and YouTube did not reply to questions about the role their platforms play in the flow of Chinese state-originated material into Taiwan; Douyin also did not respond to requests for comment.
China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out using force to bring the island under its control. Taiwan’s government rejects that claim and says it is already an independent country under its formal name, the Republic of China. Beijing refuses to speak with the DPP administration and labels President Lai a "separatist." While Beijing continues military preparations that some interpret as contingency planning for possible action against Taiwan, officials describe the information campaign as a parallel strategy aimed at wearing down Taiwan without firing a shot.
In this information campaign, Taiwan’s main opposition party, the KMT, presents a particular opening for Chinese messaging. The KMT has sought closer ties with Beijing and has framed such engagement as a way to reduce tensions that it says have been exacerbated by the DPP. This month KMT leader Cheng Li-wun met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where Xi told her the KMT and the Communist Party must "consolidate political mutual trust" and "join hands to create a bright future of the motherland's reunification." In response, the KMT said Cheng’s visit fulfilled a campaign pledge and continued a long-established tradition of high-level contacts between the KMT and the Communist Party. The party added that while differences remain, both sides favor resolving disagreements through dialogue.
Social media battleground: IORG findings
Data from the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center, commonly known as IORG, detail how Chinese outlets are incorporating Taiwanese voices into their coverage. IORG is a non-partisan group of social scientists and data analysts based in Taipei and is funded in part by U.S. and European governments, and academic institutions in Taiwan. The group’s analysis shows a substantial uptick in material featuring Taiwanese figures on Douyin operated by official Communist Party media accounts.
In the fourth quarter of 2025, IORG recorded some 560,000 videos posted on Douyin by 1,076 accounts run by official Communist Party media outlets. About 18,000 of those videos discussed Taiwan. Using facial-recognition technology, IORG identified 57 Taiwanese figures appearing in a total of 2,730 clips; the results were verified by IORG researchers and reviewed by this publication. During October and November, the number of videos featuring Taiwanese voices more than doubled compared with the prior year, and the monthly airtime of such clips rose 164% to 369 minutes.
Of the top 25 Taiwanese figures appearing in Chinese videos, 13 are affiliated with the KMT, ranging from current lawmakers and party representatives to former officials who served under past KMT governments. Two other prominent figures are senior officials in a small party that supports unification with China, while 10 are influencers known for criticizing the governing DPP. Cheng Li-wun was the most frequently featured Taiwanese figure in the Chinese clips, appearing in 460 videos across 68 Douyin accounts and generating more than five million interactions, measured as likes, comments and shares.
The Chinese videos amplified Cheng’s calls for "peace" with China, her criticism of President Lai as a "pawn" of external forces, and her portrayal of the DPP’s stance on Taiwan independence as destructive. Once those items ran on Chinese state media and on Chinese social platforms, some were repackaged and uploaded to platforms widely used in Taiwan.
In its statement, the KMT argued that Cheng’s remarks reflect mainstream aspirations for peace among the Taiwanese public and noted that the inclusion of Taiwanese voices in mainland state media reflects existing diversity of opinion in Taiwan.
Influencers and retired officers featured
Chinese outlets also drew on social influencers and retired military figures who publicly criticize the DPP. One influencer, Holger Chen Chih-han, a bodybuilder with a large youth following, said "Happy birthday, motherland" on a YouTube livestream in late September ahead of China’s National Day and described the people of Taiwan and China as "one family." Short clips from that broadcast were subsequently shared by Chinese state outlets, including China News Service.
Short segments featuring five retired senior military officials who have criticized the DPP were also widely cited by Chinese media. In one video posted by China News Service, former Taiwan Army Colonel Lai Yueh-chien asserted that Chinese drones had "entered" Taiwan undetected during exercises in December. Lai also suggested China might carry out a decapitation strike against "pro-independence leaders" while they slept. That clip later appeared on Facebook and YouTube. IORG noted the claim about approaching drones originally surfaced in a video posted on a social account run by China’s military. Taiwan’s defense ministry denied the drone claim. China News Service did not respond to queries and Lai Yueh-chien declined to comment about his presence in Chinese state media.
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council told this publication the government hoped retired officers would be mindful of public perception and should not echo Beijing’s rhetoric. The council added that former military personnel "must not forget the oath they once swore to be loyal" to Taiwan.
Psychological targeting and public opinion
Polling data cited in January by the Election Study Center at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University show shifts in how the public describes preferred cross-strait arrangements. Support for maintaining the status quo indefinitely has risen eight points to 33.5% since 2020, while support for maintaining the status quo but moving toward independence has declined almost four points to 21.9%. The combined share of those who favor immediate unification or a status quo that moves toward unification has remained roughly stable at around 7%.
It remains unclear whether the intensification of China’s information campaign has altered public attitudes on independence or unification. Annual survey data show no discernible change in Taiwanese preferences on those questions since 2024, a period that approximately overlaps with the wave of intensified messaging documented by IORG.
Despite the lack of clear shifts in long-term opinion, analysts and security officials warn that the message barrage may nonetheless erode morale and foster a sense that resistance is futile. One outside analyst, Bonnie Glaser, head of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, said the campaign aims to lower morale, instill psychological despair and convince people they have no future as an autonomous polity, making unification appear the best option. The German Marshall Fund receives funding from U.S. and European governments and from companies including technology and defense firms.
Taiwan’s intelligence services recorded more than 45,000 sets of inauthentic social-media accounts and 2.3 million pieces of disinformation on China-Taiwan issues last year, according to a January report by Taiwan’s National Security Bureau. The report described Beijing’s information operations as seeking to deepen divisions within Taiwan, weaken the will to resist, and win support for China’s positions.
"They want you to doubt the military and doubt Taiwan, to make you feel that no one will come to help you if war breaks out," one Taiwanese security official said of state-run Chinese media. Taiwan’s government last year issued a civil-defense handbook to households that explicitly warned that amid heightened tensions, any claims that Taiwan had surrendered should be treated as false. That advisory was framed as a recognition that the information battle is intensifying even without kinetic conflict.
Conclusion
Beijing’s strategy of amplifying Taiwanese critics on Chinese state media and social platforms now relies heavily on familiar local voices and social influencers to make anti-government messages more persuasive. Taiwanese officials and researchers say the effort has three principal objectives: to discredit the DPP, to sap public confidence in Taiwan’s capacity to resist, and to reduce domestic support for large-scale added defense spending. Taipei’s countermeasures include strengthening media literacy among the military and public, while political actors in Taiwan continue to debate the best approach to cross-strait relations.
Given the scope and scale of the campaign documented by IORG and reported by Taiwanese security services, the information operations present a continuing challenge for Taiwan’s political resilience and for how the public interprets claims about security and defense.