The U.S. administration has stepped up pressure on Cuba in the wake of a January operation using military force that removed Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Despite Caracas' previous role as a major supporter of Havana, analysts say Cuba is unlikely to follow Venezuela's path exactly because of distinct political, economic and legal features on the island.
Succession and leadership
A central difference between the two situations lies in who could plausibly assume control if top Cuban leaders were removed or incapacitated. In Venezuela, then-Vice President Delcy Rodriguez assumed leadership after U.S. forces seized Maduro in a rapid January raid and has served as acting president since. Rodriguez had been Maduro's deputy, providing a clear line of succession.
By contrast, Cuba lacks an obvious successor to President Miguel Diaz-Canel or to former President Ra l Castro, who is 94 and was indicted this week in an effort by the U.S. to increase pressure on Havana. Experts note that Cuba's security services have methodically eliminated alternative power centers, reducing the chance that a single deputy could step in to run the country.
Orlando P e9rez, a scholar of U.S.-Latin America relations, said the island's security apparatus has "dismantled, systematically dismantled, every alternative or potentially alternative power source." That structural characteristic complicates any scenario that would mirror Venezuela's rapid leadership change.
Cuba also lacks a well-known opposition leader analogous to Venezuela's Maria Corina Machado, who is a Nobel laureate and a prominent figure that won elections in 2024 but was not permitted to take office. Cuba does not have a comparable political figure with national prominence positioned to claim leadership or to mobilize mass political transition.
There has been speculation surrounding Ra al Rodriguez Castro, the grandson of the former president, after his recent meeting with CIA Director John Ratcliffe during a rare visit by a U.S. intelligence chief to Havana. That visit led to talk he might be willing to work with Washington. However, he holds no formal government post, is not expected to break with his family, and participated in a rally in Havana protesting his grandfather's indictment.
Benefits and risks of increased pressure
Cuba has been at odds with the United States since the 1959 revolution led by Fidel Castro. The current administration's posture is influenced by strong support from hardline Cuban-American constituencies in Florida who have long advocated for policies aimed at regime change. The U.S. president has been explicit about wanting to see political change on the island.
Historically viewed as a Soviet-era adversary located close to U.S. shores, Cuba more recently has been discussed as a potential avenue for influence by other global powers. The island's ability to confront the United States has, however, been diminished by economic troubles and shifts in external alliances since the end of the Soviet bloc.
Experts warn heightened instability could generate a migration crisis. Large portions of the population have endured extended power shortages amid the U.S. blockade, and observers say widespread blackouts could prompt people to flee the island in the event of war or severe chaos.
From a security standpoint, Cuba's military is seen as more ideologically cohesive and deeply embedded with the state than Venezuela's was, making it more likely to resist external military pressure. Dozens of Cuban agents who provided security for Maduro were killed in Venezuela in January, and survivors of that incident may have gained operational insights into how U.S. forces conduct raids. Cuba is also regarded as comparatively advanced in surveillance and intelligence, a capability enhanced by years of cooperation with Russia and China.
Economic stakes and what Cuba would 'bring' to the U.S.
A key reason Venezuela attracted immediate U.S. business interest is its natural resource base. U.S. companies have been preparing to produce oil in Venezuela, and the country's recent export increases have made its energy sector an obvious target for new investment.
Cuba, by contrast, does not possess comparable natural resources. Its economy is dominated by state-run tourism, which even before the recent downturn lagged behind other Caribbean destinations in both price and quality. Those tourism weaknesses have been aggravated by shortages linked to the administration's "maximum pressure" campaign, the U.S. blockade, and threats of tariffs against nations that provide fuel to the island.
Another economic complication is the virtually non-existent private sector. The economy is heavily controlled by Gaesa, a military-run conglomerate that is subject to U.S. sanctions. Gaesa oversees many of Cuba's most important assets, including the top hotels, the largest port, the main commercial bank, and a wide network of supermarkets, gas stations and remittance businesses. That concentration of economic power within a military entity complicates prospects for U.S. commercial engagement and poses challenges for any transition that might open the country to foreign investment.
Legal constraints on U.S. action
U.S. policy toward Cuba is constrained by domestic law, notably the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which links the removal of the U.S. embargo to specific political changes on the island - for example, the establishment of a democratically elected government. Legal restrictions mean Washington cannot unilaterally reset relations with Cuba without a marked political shift by Cuban authorities.
The U.S. justified the Venezuela operation partly by alleging the Maduro government was involved in "narcoterrorism." Cuban officials have not been charged with similar offenses and have asserted they cooperate with the U.S. on counter-narcotics efforts. That difference in legal allegations further distinguishes the two cases in terms of the stated legal rationale for U.S. actions.
Political drivers inside the U.S.
Within the administration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is portrayed as a leading advocate for a more confrontational Cuban policy. Rubio, described in the administration context as an outspoken Cuba hawk and national security adviser, is identified as a central figure behind the current approach to Havana. Observers point to the political incentives at play - significant changes in Cuba could enhance the domestic profile of officials who back tough measures, while failure carries reputational and financial risks for the United States at a moment of large budget deficits and concurrent foreign engagements.
The article notes that the U.S. is already conducting a costly campaign in Iran, the expenses of which some estimates place in the billions per day. Pursuing major changes in Cuba would add to the strategic and fiscal burdens facing U.S. policymakers.
Conclusion
Analysts argue Cuba’s unique mix of political control, military cohesion, limited natural resources, and an economy dominated by a sanctioned military conglomerate make it a different proposition from Venezuela. Legal limits on U.S. action and the absence of an obvious successor or a prominent opposition leader reduce the feasibility of a rapid regime change model similar to what occurred in Venezuela. At the same time, the risks of migration, military confrontation and economic disruption mean that any policy aimed at forcing change in Havana carries significant uncertainty and potential costs.