A U.S. communication to congressional leaders discloses that the administration is advancing a civil nuclear cooperation framework with Saudi Arabia that does not include the non-proliferation protections the United States has historically required, according to a copy of the document reviewed by Reuters.
The notice to Congress outlines the administration's intention to pursue a so-called 123 Agreement with Riyadh - the statutory framework for civil nuclear cooperation - while stopping short of adopting the Additional Protocol, a set of measures that gives the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency broader inspection authority, including the power to conduct snap inspections at undeclared sites.
The politics around the proposed pact are framed by heightened international concern about nuclear competition. The notice comes as global anxieties over an arms buildup have risen following the expiration of the last strategic arms limitation treaty between Russia and the United States earlier this month and amid reports of China enhancing its nuclear forces.
Arms control organizations, many Democrats and a number of prominent Republicans have for years conditioned U.S. civil nuclear cooperation on rigorous limits that would prevent partner states from acquiring pathways to nuclear weapons. Those conditions have included prohibitions on uranium enrichment and on reprocessing spent fuel - activities that can be diverted to weapons production - as well as adoption of the Additional Protocol for enhanced IAEA oversight. The document notes these concerns but signals a different approach.
The administration's report to lawmakers asserts that the draft U.S.-Saudi 123 Agreement would place U.S. industry at the center of Saudi Arabia's civil nuclear program and would "ensure nuclear-proliferation safeguards are in place." At the same time, the text of the notice explicitly contemplates "additional safeguards and verification measures to the most sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation" between the two countries - language that includes enrichment and reprocessing as possible subjects of cooperation.
That clause effectively creates a mechanism by which Riyadh could pursue enrichment or reprocessing under the terms of a U.S.-backed pact, a departure from the guardrails that many arms control experts and lawmakers have said are essential.
Advocacy groups and some members of Congress say the administration has not adequately assessed the proliferation implications or the precedent that such an agreement could set. Kelsey Davenport, the head of nonproliferation policy for the Arms Control Association, wrote that the report "raises concerns that the Trump administration has not carefully considered the proliferation risks posed by its proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia or the precedent this agreement may set."
Davenport further urged congressional scrutiny, saying it "behooves Congress" to check the administration's authority to finalize a pact and to examine not only the direct implications for Saudi Arabia but also the wider precedent the agreement would establish for U.S. nuclear cooperation worldwide.
The timing of the administration's notification sets a statutory clock in motion. The notice sent in November triggered the process that allows the administration roughly 90 days after that report to submit a full 123 Agreement to Congress. The Arms Control Association said the administration could formally send the 123 Agreement to Congress as soon as February 22. If the administration does so, Congress then has a 90-day window in which both chambers must pass resolutions objecting to the pact in order to block it. If neither the Senate nor the House adopts a resolution of disapproval within that period, the agreement would take effect and enable Saudi Arabia to develop a civil nuclear program under its terms.
Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has publicly linked his country's nuclear ambitions to regional dynamics. In remarks to Fox News in 2023 he said, "If they get one, we have to get one," adding that a weapon would be necessary "for security reasons, and for balancing power in the Middle East, but we don’t want to see that."
Requests for comment to the White House and the State Department did not receive immediate responses. Saudi Arabia's embassy in Washington likewise did not immediately reply to a request for comment.
The document provided to Congress and the subsequent analysis from arms control advocates highlight a narrowing window for legislative intervention. Lawmakers and market participants watching energy, defense and nuclear technology sectors will be monitoring whether Congress exercises its prerogative to scrutinize or block the pact, given the potential implications for global non-proliferation norms and for companies involved in civil nuclear supply chains.
As the process unfolds, critical questions for policymakers and investors center on the specific verification measures that would be negotiated, the limits - if any - that would be applied to enrichment and reprocessing activities, and the ultimate shape of U.S. industry involvement in Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear buildout.