Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has taken a more decisive wartime role across the country's security and strategic decision-making apparatus despite recent losses among senior commanders, according to multiple sources with close knowledge of the force. Officials and analysts describe an organisation that had prepared to withstand decapitation by delegating authority downward, enabling sustained drone-and-missile operations across the region while maintaining a strict internal security posture.
Sources say the Guards had anticipated a targeted campaign against their leadership and put in place redundancy that extends several ranks down the chain of command. That pre-emptive decentralisation has allowed operations to continue after successive strikes removed senior figures, but it also increases the chance that empowered mid-level commanders could initiate strikes with less political oversight, raising the prospect of miscalculation or escalation with neighbouring states.
In recent days, Iran has conducted attacks beyond its borders, including an incident in which it fired on Turkey, a NATO country, underlining the regional reach of its campaign. Inside Iran, the Guards’ entrenched role at multiple levels of state decision-making and its severe approach to internal security are likely to make large-scale protests less probable, curbing the possibility that an external strike would trigger an uprising or regime change.
Decentralisation as doctrine and practice
Those close to the Guards say decentralisation has been central to the Corps' doctrine for nearly two decades. The approach was crystallised after observing the collapse of Iraqi forces during the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and was designed so that provinces and local units could defend themselves and preserve the regime's authority even if higher-level command nodes were disrupted.
Deputy defence minister and Guards member Reza Talaeinik set out the mechanism publicly, stating that each commander in the structure had designated successors stretching three ranks down, ensuring immediate replacement if a commander were killed. "The role of each unit and section has been organised in such a way that if any commander is killed, a successor immediately takes their place," he said in a television interview.
Analysts familiar with the Guards' internal workings describe how that planning has paid operational dividends. Israeli strikes in the prior year eliminated senior figures including the overall head and the heads of the Guards' intelligence, aerospace and economic units. More recently, an airstrike killed Mohammad Pakpour, the latest head of the Corps' ground forces, yet the force has continued to operate.
Operational aims: external response and internal control
The decentralisation plan was deliberately framed to allow the Guards to fulfil dual roles simultaneously - acting as the main military spearhead responding to external attacks, while also enforcing internal security across the Islamic Republic. This dual-purpose doctrine helps explain the Guards' pervasive presence in strategic decisions during wartime and their continued focus on repression of internal unrest should it arise.
One source close to the Guards reported that the Corps' new head, Ahmad Vahidi, has been present at every high-level meeting, and that the force's overriding objective remains the survival of Iran's Islamic revolutionary system and its stated goals. Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi told Al Jazeera that many of the Guards' units operate on pre-established general instructions rather than direct, real-time orders from the current political leadership: "These units are operating based on general instructions given to them in advance, rather than direct, real-time command from the current political leadership," he said.
Sources say the Guards now have visibility into nearly every major strategic decision in Iran, extending beyond the central role they held even before the war. That reach is reinforced by a political leadership in which the three most senior figures are former Guards members, providing institutional continuity between military and political aims.
Signs of cohesion and potential fault lines
Although the Guards are not monolithic - internal factional rivalries, personal disputes and differing views on the force's mission exist - several sources described the organisation as more unified than at other times when Iran faces direct attack. The wartime generation that shaped the Guards' outlook has moved into senior state positions, reinforcing the mutual perspectives and networks that tie military strategy to political decision-making.
Kasra Aarabi, head of research on the Guards at United Against Nuclear Iran, noted that if the conflict ends with the regime intact, the Guards' position within the state is likely to grow. "If the conflict suddenly stops and the regime survives, we can be certain the Guards will have an even more important role," he said, pointing to strong ties between the Corps and potential claimants to the supreme leadership.
However, Aarabi also warned that relentless targeting of both senior and more junior commanders could eventually strain the Corps' ability to preserve strategic coherence. He observed what he described as increasingly erratic attacks on civilian targets in Gulf monarchies in the days following the strikes, which may indicate a fraying of command discipline or a deliberate attempt to signal that attacking Iran carries wider consequences.
Political and economic dimensions of the Guards' power
The Guards were established soon after the 1979 revolution to defend the new republic and act as a counterweight to Iran's regular armed forces. Answering directly to the supreme leader, the Corps has grown into a state-within-a-state, combining military influence, an intelligence apparatus and substantial economic interests directed at preserving the Islamic system of rule.
As sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme tightened, the Guards expanded into the economy. Its construction arm, Khatam al-Anbia, secured significant contracts, including in the energy sector. The Corps also became the conduit for relationships with Shi'ite proxy groups across the Middle East, while its volunteer paramilitary force, the Basij, has been deployed to suppress domestic unrest.
Many of Iran's current senior officials served with the Guards during the formative years of the Iran-Iraq war, and their wartime experience shaped both strategy and personnel networks. President Masoud Pezeshkian served as a battlefield surgeon, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf fought on the frontlines before leading the Guards' air unit, and Ali Larijani served as a staff officer. These shared backgrounds have helped institutionalise the Guards' influence within the highest levels of government.
What the posture means for regional stability
The Guards' hardened wartime posture, decentralised command and deep integration into political and economic structures have enabled Iran to sustain a robust drone-and-missile campaign despite successive decapitation strikes. That capability complicates efforts by external actors to degrade Iran's military reach through targeted attacks, but it also raises the risk that empowered mid-tier commanders could act in ways that expand the conflict beyond intended boundaries.
At the same time, the Corps' role as an enforcer of internal security suggests that hopes of provoking a domestic uprising following strikes on Iran's leadership may be misplaced. The combination of surviving political figures with Guards backgrounds and the force's internal security apparatus reduces the likelihood that external pressure will translate into regime change.
How the choice of Iran's next supreme leader unfolds following Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's death may further solidify the Guards' influence, depending on the ties between successors and the Corps. Observers point to Mojtaba Khamenei as a likely candidate with close ties to the Guards, which could enhance the force's institutional clout should he assume the top post.
Outlook
For now, the Guards' combination of decentralised authority and pervasive state influence has preserved operational continuity and a hardline security stance. Yet sustained attrition among commanders and the empowerment of mid-level officers create fault lines that could produce unintended actions and complicate efforts to limit the conflict's scope.
In sum, the IRGC's wartime posture reflects a deliberate strategy to survive and project power even after significant leadership losses, an approach that both strengthens Iran's retaliatory capacity and raises the risk of broader regional escalation.