Authorities and militia figures in Iraq say Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has created new, covert Iraqi cells tasked with launching strikes on Gulf states where U.S. forces are based. According to eight Iraqi sources with knowledge of the matter, these units were established to carry out cross-border drone attacks while remaining insulated from Iraq’s more visible militia networks.
Three to four of the new cells, each reportedly composed of roughly 10 elite Iraqi Shi’ite fighters, conducted at least seven drone strikes between April 20 and May 17. The operations originated from desert locations close to the southern Iraqi cities of Basra and Samawa and targeted sites in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, three of the sources said. Information available to Iraqi security services included human intelligence, intercepted communications and physical evidence recovered at launch sites, the sources added.
Some members of these formations were drawn from Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella grouping of hardline Shi’ite factions that includes thousands of fighters. But the new cells purportedly operate independently of that organization’s command structure and answer directly to the IRGC, according to the sources. Those sources include two Iraqi military officials, another security official and five local militia commanders.
Why Tehran established covert Iraqi cells
Militia commanders and security figures described the creation of the cells as a tactical evolution by the IRGC. With many of Iran’s proxy organizations weakened and Tehran itself facing military and economic strain, the IRGC appears to be relying on smaller, more tightly controlled groups that are ideologically hardened and less dependent on broad resource support.
That shift is presented by the five militia commanders as a way for Iran to sustain its ability to strike across the region while reducing the exposure of its established proxy networks. In this approach, loyalty to the IRGC, plausible deniability and operational impact are prioritized over mass recruitment and large financial outlays, the commanders said.
Islamic Resistance in Iraq-affiliated groups have previously claimed responsibility for numerous drone and rocket attacks on U.S. assets inside Iraq, actions that prompted retaliatory airstrikes. Those attacks intensified after what Iraqi sources say were U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28. Despite repeated incidents, there has not been a broad mobilization of Iran’s proxy forces within Iraq’s borders.
Domestic dynamics within Iraq
Iraq is majority Shi’ite and hosts a variety of militias, many of which maintain close ties to Tehran and form part of what Iran views as its regional "Axis of Resistance." Several influential Shi’ite factions have signaled in recent months that they are willing to de-emphasize armed struggle and concentrate on domestic politics to avoid escalating conflict with the U.S. administration. That political recalibration among some groups may have driven the IRGC to field units that it controls directly, according to Jasim al-Bahadli, a retired Iraqi army general and expert on Shi’ite armed formations, and two lawmakers from the Shi’ite governing alliance.
Two of the powerful factions, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades, announced this month they would begin surrendering weapons to state authorities after repeated U.S. warnings to Baghdad to disband militias operating outside state control. That development is among the factors, officials and analysts say, behind the emergence of smaller IRGC-run cadres.
"The newer groups established by the IRGC appear smaller, more ideologically hardened and more tightly controlled, reflecting Iran’s need to conserve resources amid economic strain," Bahadli said.
International diplomacy and security responses
While an interim U.S.-Iran agreement was reached on Wednesday to halt the war and open negotiations on contentious issues including the future of Tehran’s nuclear program, Iranian officials have indicated that support for "resistance groups" is not negotiable and the deal does not tackle that subject. Iran’s foreign ministry and its missions to the United Nations in New York and Geneva did not respond to detailed questions on the newly reported Iraqi cells.
The U.S. State Department reiterated expectations that Iraq act immediately to dismantle the tools of Iran’s destabilizing activities in Iraq, including the IRGC and Iran-aligned terrorist militias in the country. In a meeting on Monday, Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, and U.S. envoy Tom Barrack discussed Baghdad’s plans to ensure "the complete disarmament and disbandment of all armed groups" operating outside state control and to make certain that Iraqi territory cannot be used to threaten regional peace, according to a joint statement.
Zaidi’s military spokesman, Sabah al-Numan, declined to comment for this account. Officials in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not respond to requests for comment.
Operational details and recent attacks
Sources with access to security reporting and local militia intelligence say that new, low-profile groups based in Iraq carried out at least three drone strikes against targets in Kuwait, two against sites in Saudi Arabia and two aimed at locations in the UAE. Those same sources named Kuwait’s Ali Al Salem Air Base - where U.S. forces are present - and a military terminal at Kuwait’s international airport among the facilities struck, though they did not elaborate further on damage or casualties.
Attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE were intercepted, the sources said, but they did not have confirmation of the intended specific targets for those strikes. The intelligence pointing to these operations was drawn from a combination of human-sourced reporting, intercepted communications and material evidence from the locations used to launch the drones. Reuters was not named as the recipient of the information in these sources’ accounts.
Implications for Prime Minister Zaidi and Iraq’s foreign ties
The emergence of these IRGC-run cells presents an early and significant challenge for Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, who took office last month after U.S. pressure on dominant Shi’ite political blocs to exclude a former premier with strong Iranian ties. Baghdad has long managed a delicate relationship between its two closest patrons, Washington and Tehran, a balancing act that became more difficult during the war.
Attacks traced to Iraqi territory risk undermining Baghdad’s recent efforts to repair relations with wealthy Gulf neighbors. Those ties had begun to thaw in recent years despite longstanding tensions dating to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. In April, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE summoned Iraqi envoys to protest the strikes.
Iraqi authorities are probing whether the May 17 drone attack that caused a fire at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant was carried out by one of these new groups, security officials said. Saudi authorities stated they intercepted three drones on the same day that had entered Saudi airspace from Iraq; Iraqi officials attributed that interception to one of the newly identified groups. Prime Minister Zaidi publicly condemned the two attacks as criminal and pledged a joint inquiry with the Gulf countries to determine whether Iraqi soil was used to launch them. Sabah al-Numan, Zaidi’s spokesman, did not answer further questions about the status of that investigation.
Wider regional context described by Iraqi sources
Iraqi and militia sources describe Tehran’s regional network as having been eroded since October 7, 2023, when a large-scale attack by Hamas on Israel triggered sustained Israeli operations against militants in Gaza and Lebanon, and intensified strikes against Iran-aligned forces elsewhere. Those developments, along with international airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen and the toppling of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, have, according to the sources, disrupted key logistical routes and reduced the space in which Iran’s proxies can operate.
As a consequence, Iran appears to be concentrating on a narrower set of loyal, operationally capable cadres in Iraq who can achieve effect with fewer resources and greater deniability. These units reportedly emphasize drone expertise and communications skills. Iraqi security forces say they have only limited information about the groups’ full chain of command but are working to map their structures to prevent further attacks.
Economic and security fallout
The conflict has struck the energy-rich Gulf region, disrupting supplies and contributing to rising inflation globally. Tehran’s responses to earlier attacks included effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz and undertaking a campaign of drone and missile strikes against Gulf neighbors. The new attacks originating from Iraq add another layer of risk for regional security and energy markets, officials say.
For Baghdad, unraveling the leadership and logistical ties of these covert cells is likely to be an urgent priority to avoid further retaliation, preserve diplomatic gains with Gulf states and reduce pressure from Washington to dismantle Iran-aligned armed groups operating on Iraqi soil.
Note on sourcing: The factual content above is drawn from multiple Iraqi military, security and militia sources who provided details about the existence, composition and operations of the cells, as well as government statements and accounts of recent attacks and diplomatic exchanges.