The U.S. proposal for civil nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia lacks the most comprehensive nonproliferation restrictions requested by some Democratic lawmakers, according to a State Department communication made public this week.
A letter dated May 18 and sent to Democratic Senator Edward Markey states the draft agreement calls for a "bilateral safeguards agreement" between Washington and Riyadh rather than the more robust U.N.-level protocol sought by critics. The letter, written by Paul Guaglianone, identified as a senior legislative affairs official at the State Department, said the pact was in "final review" before being signed by President Donald Trump.
The administration announced last year it was pursuing a civil nuclear pact with Saudi Arabia, framing the effort as a means to support U.S. industry and deepen diplomatic ties. But the arrangement has raised concerns among nonproliferation advocates and several Democrats in Congress, who say Riyadh's nuclear ambitions are worrisome given public statements by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons capabilities if regional rival Iran did so.
In March, a group of a dozen Democratic lawmakers asked Secretary of State Marco Rubio to press for a U.N. protocol backed by the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency that would provide broad oversight of a partner country’s nuclear activities, including authority for the IAEA to carry out snap inspections at undeclared locations. The State Department letter responding to those concerns noted that the proposed accord instead mandates a bilateral safeguards framework.
The group of Democrats also urged the administration to insist on voluntary "gold standard" nonproliferation measures. That gold standard - which the letter notes was accepted by the United Arab Emirates in 2009 prior to the development of its first nuclear power plant - bans the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, both activities that can be used to produce fissile material suitable for weapons. The State Department's correspondence makes no mention of such a voluntary commitment in the draft agreement.
Guaglianone described the agreement as laying the legal groundwork for a "decades-long, multi-billion-dollar civil nuclear partnership" between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and said it advances multiple stated economic and strategic objectives for both countries. He indicated the document was moving through final review before it would be signed by the president.
The White House did not provide a timetable for presidential signature when queried, and did not outline additional steps the administration would take to ensure the security and nonproliferation dimensions of the deal beyond referring to a past statement by Energy Secretary Chris Wright. That November statement, cited by the White House, asserted the agreement contains a "firm commitment to nonproliferation."
State Department officials declined to discuss the detailed contents of the draft while it undergoes final review, but a spokesperson said the draft incorporates all legally required terms and reflects "a shared commitment by the United States and Saudi Arabia to strong nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation standards." The Saudi embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Senator Markey said the administration's approach amounted to "selling out national security," arguing the pact lacks adequate safeguards. In a statement he said the United States was providing advanced nuclear technology to a regime he described as "nuclear-weapon-wannabe Saudi Arabia" without imposing the strongest possible restrictions, and he contrasted that position with the administration's past posture toward Iran.
Under U.S. law, once the president signs a civil nuclear cooperation agreement and transmits it to Congress, lawmakers have 90 days of continuous session to pass a joint resolution opposing it. If Congress does not adopt such a resolution within that window, the agreement would enter into force, enabling expanded U.S. nuclear cooperation, technology transfer, and commercial relationships with Saudi Arabia.
Nonproliferation experts highlighted the long-term nature of nuclear reactor operations and urged stricter standards on fuel cycle activities. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said Washington should demand stronger limits - including on uranium enrichment - if the United States is to agree to share civil nuclear technology with Saudi Arabia, noting that reactors can operate for decades. "If you let a country make nuclear fuel, you’d better hope they are your friend forever," he said.
What is known:
- The State Department letter dated May 18 states the draft pact requires a bilateral safeguards agreement rather than a U.N. IAEA protocol providing broader oversight.
- The draft makes no mention of voluntary "gold standard" protections that would ban enrichment and reprocessing; the UAE accepted that standard in 2009, according to the letter.
- Officials say the agreement is in final review and is intended to establish a long-term civil nuclear partnership that serves economic and strategic goals.